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A Study on the Role of UGC Platforms in Copyright Law:         Chapter 6 UGC Platforms’ Entitlement to UGCs
 An Intermediary-oriented Approach

                 transaction would be both efficient and helpful because it draws on the UGC platforms’
                 informational advantages and experience with promoting UGCs. This is similar to the way
                 traditional producers such as publishers, record labels and film studios promoted copyrighted
                 works. Due to the marginal value of most UGCs, the sublicence royalties for individual
                 UGCs would possibly be insignificant. After all, UGC creators grant licences to the UGC
                 platform free of charge. I design a remuneration scheme to make up for UGC creators’ loss
                 of sublicencing opportunities, which is discussed in Section 6.4.2. The suggestions for a
                 platform user’s use of UGCs (proposed in Section 7.2.3) also allow certain UGC creators to
                 terminate the sublicence by the UGC platform and require the user to seek a licence directly
                 from the UGC creators.
                    Due to UGC platforms’ comparative advantages in promoting UGCs and UGC creators’
                 moderate loss resulting from UGC platforms’ sublicencing, it is fair to conclude that UGC
                 creators would implicitly agree to UGC platforms’ sublicence. This would render court
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                 intervention unnecessary.  To secure the UGC creators’ interests, I suggest some conditions
                 a UGC platform should obey with respect to the sublicencing right. First, UGC creators
                 should receive adequate notice of the sublicence. If the UGC creator does not want his/
                 her UGC to be used by a third party, the UGC creator could terminate the sublicence by
                 sending notice to both the UGC platform and the third party and demand that the third party
                 remove the UGC. A UGC creator who wants the third party to seek a licence directly from
                 himself/herself rather than from the UGC platform could also terminate the UGC platform’s
                 sublicence (this is discussed in Section 7.2.3). Second, if the UGC platform learns that the
                 sublicencee has breached the sublicence agreement or infringed the copyright of the UGC,
                 the UGC platform should notify the UGC creator who would have the right to terminate the
                 sublicence. Third, the UGC platform would have a duty to abide by the remuneration rule
                 proposed in Section 6.4.2.
                    Another characteristic of the licence set forth in ToUs/ToSs is that UGC platforms are
                 allowed to assign the licences from UGC creators to a third party. Assigning the licences has
                 been even more controversial than sublicencing because, in the case of a sublicence, UGC
                 creators still enjoy the services provided by the UGC platform they have chosen. After an
                 assignment, the services provided by the third party might not meet the expectations of the
                 UGC creators. A UGC creator uploads UGCs to a specific UGC platform because of the
                 services provided by the platform, such as social networking. This is the consideration for
                 the copyright licence granted to the UGC platform. Assigning the contract to a third party,

                 163  Consent is the most important element for a license, either an exclusive or a non-exclusive license, to be sublicensable.
                    United States v. Timken Roller Bearing Co., 83 F. Supp. 284, 309 (N.D. Ohio 1949) indicated that neither party could
                    sublicence the know-how without the consent of the other in this case. See also United States v. Imperial Chem. Indus.,
                    Ltd., 100 F. Supp. 504, 540 (S.D.N.Y. 1951), in which an exclusive licensee could not sublicence in his territory without
                    the consent of his licensor. The Ninth Circuit also determined that a non-exclusive copyright license cannot be transferred
                    without the consent of the licensor. Brandon M. Villery, ‘The Transferability of Non-Exclusive Copyright Licenses: A New
                    Default Rule for Software in the Ninth Circuit’ (1999) 22 Hastings Communications and Entertainment Law Journal 153,
                    155.


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