Page 225 - A Study on the Role of UGC Platforms in Copyright Law:An Intermediary-oriented Approach
P. 225

A Study on the Role of UGC Platforms in Copyright Law:   Chapter 7 Platform Users’ Entitlement to UGCs: Human Use and Web Scraping
 An Intermediary-oriented Approach

                    3) International treaties
                    At the 1996 WIPO Diplomatic Conference, the EU and the US patent and trademark
                 offices tried to construct a database treaty modelled on the EU Database Directive. However,
                 because a variety of complex issues relating to the Copyright Treaty and the Performances
                 and Phonograms Treaty remained unsolved, discussion of the database treaty was postponed.
                 Due to the scepticism of other member states regarding the need for sui generis database
                 protection, there has been no international agreement on a database right. Nor is it likely that
                 any consensus on a database right will be reached in the foreseeable future.
                    4) A property right or a tort-based regime
                    The intricate process of introducing a sui generis database right shows how difficult
                 it has been to strike a balance between encouraging investment in database creation and
                 preserving the public interest in fair competition in the information market. It has also posed
                 a more fundamental challenge to the underpinnings of proprietary database protection. Until
                 now, no jurisdiction other than the EU has followed the sui generis right approach. It is
                 noteworthy that except for H.R. 3531, which was criticised for overprotecting information,
                 US proposals have adopted a tort-based regime rather a property right approach. The passive
                 role of the sui generis right protection under the EU Database Directive also casts doubt on
                 the current protection of proprietary databases.
                    There have generally been two approaches to protecting information: (i) the property
                 right regime, which takes the form of copyright, patent, trademark and sui generis rights,
                 and (ii) the tort law regime, such as anti-unfair competition. Property right rules focus on
                 drawing boundaries around the property right, which acts like the fringes of a commodity.
                 Any encroachment of the boundary constitutes infringement, so this approach was also
                 coined the ‘exclusion strategy’ by Henry Smith.  Tort law rules, or ‘governance strategy’
                                                          107
                 under Henry Smith’s formulation, pay more attention to conduct. A user violates tort law
                 not because the information is covered by a property right, but because the use itself is
                 independently wrongful under the tort law, such as committing an act of unfair competition
                                   108
                 or trespass to chattels.
                    The property right regime provides more robust protection than the tort law regime. For
                 example, any putative user who wishes to use proprietary information must gain permission
                 from the right holder. In contrast, a user of non-proprietary information can use the right
                 directly and pay judicially determined damages if the use is proven to be a tort. The property
                 right regime facilitates the management and commercialisation of information through
                 contractual arrangements. It has the effect of encouraging investment in the production of



                 107  Henry E Smith, ‘Intellectual Property as Property: Delineating Entitlements in Information’ (2007) 116 Yale Law Journal
                    1742, 1745.
                 108  David D. Friedman, William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, ‘Some Economics of Trade Secret Law’ (1991) 5 Journal of
                    Economic Perspective 61, 66.


                                                                                          • 211 •
   220   221   222   223   224   225   226   227   228   229   230