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A Study on the Role of UGC Platforms in Copyright Law:                                                                                 Chapter 7 Platform Users’ Entitlement to UGCs: Human Use and Web Scraping
              An Intermediary-oriented Approach

              meaning that ‘to access a computer with authorization and to use such access to obtain or
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              alter information in the computer that the accesser is not entitled so to obtain or alter’.
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              Nevertheless, the definition itself has proven to generate more confusion than remedies.
              It has remained unclear whether a user ‘exceeds authorised access’ when she/he obtains
              or alters the information that she/he is authorised to access but uses the information for an
              unauthorised purpose, or when she/he obtains or alters the information that she/he does not
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              have authorisation to access for any purpose.
                 Under the former approach, an individual can be convicted for either accessing
              the information without authorisation, or obtaining or altering the information without
              authorisation even though the information has been accessed with authorisation. This
              suggests that both unauthorised access, which usually occurs in the case of computer
              hacking, and unauthorised use, such as an employee’s use, are subject to the CFAA. Whereas,
              under the latter approach to the interpretation of ‘exceed authorised access’, an individual
              will be convicted only if his/her access is without authorisation or the authorisation has
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              been revoked.  This interpretation is narrow than the former one. The only element is
              unauthorised access, including access without authorisation from the beginning, such as
              computer hackers’ access, and the access whose authorisation has been revoked, such as a
              former employee’s access.
                 According to Andrew Sellar’s empirical research on the past 20 years of CFAA litigation,
              the latter interpretation has prevailed in recent years, which is also the interpretation
              embraced by this thesis.  By decriminalising indivisuals who have accessed the information
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              with authorisation, this interpretation alleviates the chilling effects of the criminal statute
              and corresponds to the purpose of the CFAA, which is to thwart hackers who have no access
              to the hacked computer. The crux of the CFAA is unauthorised access. Nevertheless, the
              CFAA does not provide any guidance to define ‘authorisation’. The line between between
              unauthorised access and unauthorised use is also unclear. The following sections investigate
              the definition of these important terms.
                 (1) What constitutes ‘unauthorisation’?
                 Some have claimed that a UGC platform grants users authorisation to access its
              UGCs through its ToU/ToS. Thus, access that violates the ToU/ToS is access ‘without




              121  18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(6).
              122  Riley (n 6) 246; Clark S. Splichal, ‘Recent Development: Craigslist and the CFAA: The Untold Story’ (2016) 67 Florida L
                 Rev 1845, 1856; Williams, ‘Automation Is Not “Hacking”’ (n 109) 422-423; Andrew Sellars, ‘Twenty Years of Web Scraping
                 and the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act’ (2018) 24 Boston University Journal of Science and Technology Law 372, 375;
                 James Grimmelmann, ‘Consenting to Computer Use’ (2016) 84 George Washington Law Review 1500, 1502.
              123  United States v. Valle, 807 F.3d 508, 511-512 (2d Cir. 2015).
              124  Facebook v. Power Ventures, 828 F.3d 1068, 1074 (9th Cir. 2019).
              125  Sellars (n 122) 379-380.



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