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A Study on the Role of UGC Platforms in Copyright Law:   Chapter 7 Platform Users’ Entitlement to UGCs: Human Use and Web Scraping
 An Intermediary-oriented Approach

                 to chattels claim. 169
                    3) Trespass law or anti-unfair competition law
                    As open access and password sharing are dominant norms on the Web, access is
                 presumably authorised. Any inquiry into the legitimacy of web scraping should focus on the
                 use of the scraped data, which runs afoul of competition law. For instance, if a web scraper
                 obtains passwords from the scraped platform’s users to access and use the UGC database
                 in a way that competes with the scraped platform, it is better to examine the fairness of the
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                 specific use than to illegalise password sharing.  After all, what the scraped platform is
                 concerned with is how the scraped UGC database is used, rather than who scraped it or how
                 it was scraped.
                    Competition law has two major forms: anti-unfair competition law and anti-trust law.
                 Some jurisdictions have combined these two laws due to their joint purpose of ‘ensuring
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                 the efficient operation of [the] market economy’.  They are two different approaches to
                 the same goal. Anti-unfair competition law focuses on fair competition between individual
                 competitors by preventing unfair practices that are confusing, misleading, discrediting or
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                 free-riding, such as nuisance advertising.  Antitrust law is concerned more with individual
                 competitors’ freedom to undertake business activities. It seeks to deter restraints on trade
                 and abuses of economic power, such as discrimination, boycotting, dumping and predatory
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                 pricing.  In the context of the web scraping of UGC databases, it has often been the
                 scraped website that brings an anti-unfair competition claim and the scraper who brings the
                 antitrust claim against the scraped website’s restriction on web scraping, as in the case of
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                 hiQ v. LinkedIn.  To establish liability under the antitrust law, a scraper must prove that the
                 scraped company (i) has monopoly power in one market, (ii) has unfairly leveraged its power
                 in an anticompetitive or exclusionary manner, and (iii) is likely to monopolise a second
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                 market.  Antitrust claims in the context of web scraping are not substantively different from
                 the antitrust claims in other contexts. Hence, the competition law discussed next focuses on
                 anti-unfair competition claims that pay attention to the fairness of web scraping.

                 7.3.5 Anti-unfair competition law

                    1) Anti-unfair competition law in China
                    The anti-unfair competition law is the primary or even the sole recourse against web


                 169  Craigslist Inc. v. 3Taps Inc., 942 F. Supp. 2d 962, 980 (N.D. Cal. 2013).
                 170  Section 7.3.4.1.3.
                 171  WIPO, Protection against Unfair Competition: Analysis of the Present World Situation (1994) 12.
                 172  Ibid.
                 173  Ibid 67.
                 174  hiQ Labs, Inc. v. LinkedIn Corp., 273 F. Supp. 3d 1099, 1103-1104 (N.D. Cal. 2017).
                 175  Ibid 1117-1118; Amercian Bar Association, Antitrust Law Developments (6 edn, Amer Bar Assn 2007) 305


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