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A Study on the Role of UGC Platforms in Copyright Law:                                                                                 Chapter 7 Platform Users’ Entitlement to UGCs: Human Use and Web Scraping
              An Intermediary-oriented Approach

              freedom to restrict access or revoke access authorisation provided that such restriction is
              within the scope of antitrust law. The revocation should take the form of imposing a code-
              based authorisation system. Other methods such as sending cease and desist letters, imposing
              IP address blocks and setting CAPTCHA do not constitute an effective revocation of
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              authorisation.
                 Recent controversies over the revocation of access authorisation have arisen in situations
              where the defendant has obtained the password to the code-based authorisation system
              from the plaintiff’s employees or the plaintiff website’s users, and the plaintiff claims to
              have revoked this permission. The courts have appeared to be more solicitous of plaintiff’s
              websites when the defendant’s access authorisation has come from the password provided
              by a third party, even in a lawful way. For example, in Facebook v. Power Ventures, Power
              Ventures was a social media aggregator that provided a service allowing users to view their
              information from all social networking sites in one place. This relieved users of the burden of
              constantly switching between services like Facebook, LinkedIn and Twitter. As a prerequisite
              to providing the service, Power Ventures required Facebook users to share their Facebook
              usernames and passwords. Facebook claimed to revoke Power Ventures’ authorisation by
              sending cease and desist letters to Power Ventures and imposing IP address blocks. The court
              confirmed that the cease and desist letters and IP address blocks were sufficient to establish
              Facebook’s ‘express revocation of permission’. 150
                 In another case handed down by the same court, United States v. Nosal (II), the
              defendant gained authorisation from a current employee of the plaintiff to access an internal
              company database. The majority opinion held that ‘authorisation’ under the CFAA strictly
              referred to authorisation from the ‘system owner’.  Any other interpretation would
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              ‘render meaningless the concept of authorisation’  Acknowledging that ‘Nosal received
              particularised notice of his revoked access following a prolonged negotiation’, the court
              upheld the plaintiff website’s revocation, finding that its cease and desist letters had properly
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              revoked the defendant’s access.
                 However, the opinion that authorisation can only originate with the plaintiff website is,
              in practice, impossible to enforce. Nor does it resonate with the password sharing routine on
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              the Web.  It would be difficult to prohibit a user from sharing his/her password with family

              149  hiQ Labs, Inc. v. LinkedIn Corp., 273 F. Supp. 3d 1099, 1118 (N.D. Cal. 2017); CouponCabin LLC v. Savings, No. 2:14-CV-
                 39-TLS, 2017 WL 83337, at *9 (N.D. Ind. 11 Jan. 10, 2017) (the court acknowledged that the plaintiff has taken ‘affirmative
                 steps to restrict and/or revoke the Defendants' access to its website by "block[ing] the access of all traffic, including legitimate
                 users, emanating from certain cloud computing providers and internet service providers identified as being used particularly
                 heavily by the De-fendants to conduct scraping activities," though the court did not indicate what the kind of “blocking the
                 access of all traffic’ is).
              150  Facebook, Inc. v. Power Ventures, Inc., 844 F.3d 1058, 1068 (9th Cir. 2016).
              151  United States v. Nosal, 844 F.3d 1024, 1051 (9th Cir. 2016).
              152  Ibid 1036.
              153  Ibid 1030.
              154  Williams, ‘Automation Is Not “Hacking”’ (n 118) 433.


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