Page 86 - A Study on the Role of UGC Platforms in Copyright Law:An Intermediary-oriented Approach
P. 86

A Study on the Role of UGC Platforms in Copyright Law:                                                           Chapter 3 Copyright Rules for Online Intermediaries: From Safe Harbour to a New Intermediary Liability Scheme
              An Intermediary-oriented Approach

              infringing activities (KaZaA). Some courts have even introduced new requirements for
              exemptions, such as the complements added to the Sony rule regarding dual-purpose service
              (Aimster), and the intent element brought in to establish copyright inducement liability
              (Grokster).
                 The controversies and uncertainties over the applicability of the safe harbour rule to P2P
              service providers, as this thesis argues, are rooted in the overall incompatibility of the safe
              harbour rule and P2P technology resulting from the different technical infrastructures of ISPs.
                 What the legislators of the safe harbour doctrine had in mind was ISPs with client-server
                                                                   177
              modes, representing a centralised technological infrastructure.  Under this structure, ISPs
                                                                                          178
              transmit, cache, host and locate information in a passive way at the direction of users.
              The client-server ISP perfectly complies with the copyright owners’ privilege under the safe
                                                  179
              harbour rule of sending take down notices.  Once the infringing material has been removed
              from the server pursuant to the copyright owners’ notice, the infringing material does not
              spread widely. However, ISPs providing P2P service enable and assist users to find resources
              from other users and download. Because the information is stored in each users’ computer
              rather than the server of the P2P network, deleting the infringing material from one computer
              would not influence the material in another computer. This has made it difficult to combat
                                   180
              copyright infringement.  In other words, both conditions underpinning the safe harbour
              doctrine illustrated in Section 3.2.1 have failed in the context of P2P: (i) P2P providers
              actively assist in the location and transfer of infringing content; and (ii) the copyright
              owners’ takedown notice is insufficient to curtail the endless infringements initiated by
              decentralised users.
                 The inadaptability of the safe harbour doctrine to the P2P technology has been concerned
              with the basis of the intermediary-exempt rule rather than the technical details of how P2P
              providers work. That is why the cases that support the extension of the safe harbour rule
              to P2P providers have been based more on the negative consequence of prohibiting new
              technology than on the standard of the qualified categories or specific elements under safe
              harbour. For example, the CJEU reversed the injunction against SABAM and explicitly
              stated that such requirement failed to strike a fair balance ‘between the right to intellectual
              property, on the one hand, and the freedom to conduct business, the right to protection of
                                                                               181
              personal data and the freedom to receive or impart information, on the other’.

              177  Elkin-Koren, ‘Making Technology Visible’ (n 32) 39.
              178  Ibid 21; Mathias Strasser, ‘Beyond Napster: How the Law Might Respond to a Changing Internet Architecture’ (2001) 28
                 Northern Kentucky Law Review 660, 694.
              179  ‘A service provider will not be found to have “the right and ability to control” infringing activity simply because it has the
                 general ability to remove infringing material and terminate the accounts of repeat infringers’.See UMG Recordings v. Veoh,
                 718 F.3d 1006, 1030 (9th Cir. 2013); Greg Young Publishing, Inc. v. Zazzle, Inc., 2017 WL 2729584 (C.D. Cal. 2016).
              180  Elkin-Koren, ‘Making Technology Visible’ (n 32) 40.
              181  Scarlet Extended SA v Société belge des auteurs, compositeurs et éditeurs SCRL (SABAM) (C-70/10) [2011] ECR I-11959,
                 para 53.


              • 72 •
   81   82   83   84   85   86   87   88   89   90   91